


(Mobile ebook) Confronting Iraq: U.S. Policy and the Use of Force Since the Gulf War

Confronting Iraq: U.S. Policy and the Use of Force Since the Gulf War

Daniel Byman, Matther Waxman
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Daniel Byman, Matther Waxman : Confronting Iraq: U.S. Policy and the Use of Force Since the Gulf War
before purchasing it in order to gage whether or not it would be worth my time, and all praised Confronting Iraq: U.S. Policy and the Use of Force Since the Gulf War:

1 of 1 people found the following review helpful. Good Background For Today's EventsBy John G. HilliardI thought this book had a great history of the events from the end of the first Gulf War to start of 2001. The author's detail out each major event and UN resolution and what the Iraq and US did or did not do as a result. It was interesting that

many times, basically every time, there was a new resolution Iraq ended up first playing games and then backing down. It almost seemed to be the behavior of a spoiled brat. It was also very interesting where the authors can show that Iraq got close to having the UN stop the sanctions, but each time Saddam would do something dumb and the world would demand that the sanctions be put back in place. What also comes through is the very difficult if almost impossible position the UN is in trying to enforce resolutions when the only power they have is rented / given to them by other countries. What this has created is a situation that only resolutions heavily supported by the US get the US military backing thus have the teeth to be effective. The one downside of the book was the chapter long discussion on what coercion meant the definition and how the word should correctly be used. Nice info for a high school reader but it just slowed the book down for the rest of us. Overall I liked the book, it was a bit dry and could have been a bit more detailed, but it was a nice review of the past ten years. The real value is putting some facts behind what has been so talked about over the past year and what was the Iraqi position as it related to the UN resolutions. If you have been interested in this situation over the past year then you will probably enjoy this book.

Although Iraq remains hostile to the United States, Baghdad has repeatedly compromised, and at times caved, in response to U.S. pressure and threats. An analysis of attempts to coerce Iraq since Desert Storm reveals that military strikes and other forms of pressure that threatened Saddam Husayn's relationship with his power base proved effective at forcing concessions from the Iraqi regime. When coercing Saddam or other foes, U.S. policymakers should design a strategy around the adversary's center of gravity while seeking to neutralize adversary efforts to counter-coerce the United States and appreciating the policy constraints imposed by domestic politics and international alliances.

From the Publisher Although Saddam Husayn's Iraq has regularly defied U.S. pressure, a close look at recent history reveals that Baghdad has also often retreated in the face of U.S. threats or limited military strikes. This mixed record illustrates many of the challenges that commonly arise when confronting major regional adversaries. This report seeks to derive lessons for future confrontations with Baghdad and for coercive diplomacy in general. It examines the nature of Iraq as an adversary, U.S. objectives in the Persian Gulf region, and the historical record of recent attempts to coerce Iraq. It then assesses Iraq's vulnerabilities and concludes by drawing broader implications for successful coercion. This assessment is intended to inform both policymakers and individuals concerned with the use of force in general and with Persian Gulf security in particular. Policymakers can draw on this assessment in judging how to better coerce Iraq and how to coerce other adversaries elsewhere in the world. This research was conducted for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Threat Reduction within the International Security and Defense Policy Center of RAND's National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the unified commands, and the defense agencies. About the Author Daniel L. Byman (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Ph.D. in political science) is a policy analyst at Rand.